Emergence
of a Derg-Like Regime in Ethiopia
(By Lencho Lata)
Fundamental
changes started taking place in the TPLF in the mid-1980s. As a result
of worldwide humanitarian response to the 1984/85 famine, TPLF stores
were filled with donated grain, and its coffers with humanitarian
financial donations. And thanks to hundreds of thousands peasants
uprooted by the famine, there were no shortage of recruits. Famine-generated
dollars enabled the TPLF to import arms, and especially ammunition,
from China and elsewhere. This situation resulted in the creation
of a TPLF military machine that outgrew the objective of the liberation
of Tigray. Hence, the TPLF leaders started casting their eyes on the
rest of the empire and stepped up the preparation to become the new
masters of the empire. For this, they started fashioning an empire-wide
front. The manner in which they chose to do so put them on a trajectory
that inexorably led them to undermine the democratization pact they
entered to in July 1991. There is no indication that they wish to
deviate from this path which led to the restoration of a Derg-like
regime in Ethiopia.
Let
us briefly look at the policy that the TPLF crafted in order to
become an Ethiopia-wide front. In the early 1980s the idea of forming
a United Front to coordinate the fighting against the Derg was being
espoused by various groups. The TPLF had a unique suggestion of
simultaneously forming a tactical United Front and a strategic United
Democratic Front. Alliance with the former was expected to survive
only as long as the Derg lasted while the latter was intended
to eventually emerge as the ruling party. Believing this to be a
scheme to use future enemies against the present one, many fronts
rejected the TPLF invitation to join their United Front. After all
independent organizations turned down their invitation either of
the two kinds of fronts, the TPLF leaders started fabricating pliable
groups out of hostage individuals. The result was the formation
by the TPLF of bogus liberation organizations for the Oromo, Afar,
Amhara, etc.; often bearing the appellation Peoples Democratic Organizations
(PDO). Thereafter, the TPLF began the incestuous practice that it
considered necessary to form the EPRDF – wedding its offspring.
Simultaneously,
the TPLF stepped up the formation of the so-called Marxist-Leninist
core of the TPLF in its subsidiaries. It created the organ, and
the security apparatus that pervade all branches of the EPRDF to
serve as instruments for stifling any diversity within it. The PDOs
can survive only by paying complete allegiance to their creator
and master, the TPLF. It is not likely the TPLF will ever overcome
the inevitable attitude of patronage of these bodies that it brought
into existence. This situation inevitably puts the PDOs in a paradoxical
position of posing as the spokesperson of their nations while in
practice advancing the Tigrayan agenda of domination. Unless their
allegiance to the TPLF takes precedence, however, the EPRDF’s dominant
position in the empire cannot last for long.
The
PDOs, who are burdened with this kind of disability stand no chance
in a fair peaceful political competition with other independent
political organizations. Hence, they will be forced to bank on the
coercive effect of TPLF/EPRDF military backing instead of winning
their community by persuasive means. And every time they employ
this option their alienation from and rejection by their respective
communities increase. This path cannot lead to the cultivation of
a democratic relationship with their own society or with other groups.
The lack of internal democracy in the EPRDF is perhaps the most
serious obstacle for the hope of overall democratization of the
empire.
Clearly
the TPLF/EPRDF has nothing to gain in the short term by allowing
such an internal practice of genuine democracy. The Tigrayans have
always been second on Ethiopia’s political totem pole. The TPLF’s
aim at least since mid-1980s has been to be on top. The TPLF/EPRDF
acceptance of democracy, however, could thrust them into the number
three position after Oromos and Amharas, basically because of demographic
reasons.
The
other equally problematic factor is the refusal of the overthrown
Amhara elite to reconcile themselves to the current political reality
or to interact with spokespersons of other colonized nations in
Ethiopia on a basis of equality and partnership. Their only agenda
continues to be the recovery of their privileged political, economic,
cultural and linguistic status. They approach other groups only
to manipulate them to do the fighting so that they can return to
their previous position. This became clear when Oromos and other
southern peoples tried to make a common cause with some of the remnants
of the overthrown elite through discussions in Paris in late 1993.
The
new situation is slowly crystallizing Ethiopian politics into three
irreconcilable elements. The present Tigrayan ruling clique appears
determined to stay in power, like its predecessors. The overthrown
elite is determined to recoup its eminent position. And those who
desire to become equal partners in the affairs of the empire are
frustrated and continue to press for the respect of their legitimate
political rights.
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