Emergence of a Derg-Like Regime in Ethiopia
(By Lencho Lata)

Fundamental changes started taking place in the TPLF in the mid-1980s. As a result of worldwide humanitarian response to the 1984/85 famine, TPLF stores were filled with donated grain, and its coffers with humanitarian financial donations. And thanks to hundreds of thousands peasants uprooted by the famine, there were no shortage of recruits. Famine-generated dollars enabled the TPLF to import arms, and especially ammunition, from China and elsewhere. This situation resulted in the creation of a TPLF military machine that outgrew the objective of the liberation of Tigray. Hence, the TPLF leaders started casting their eyes on the rest of the empire and stepped up the preparation to become the new masters of the empire. For this, they started fashioning an empire-wide front. The manner in which they chose to do so put them on a trajectory that inexorably led them to undermine the democratization pact they entered to in July 1991. There is no indication that they wish to deviate from this path which led to the restoration of a Derg-like regime in Ethiopia.

Let us briefly look at the policy that the TPLF crafted in order to become an Ethiopia-wide front. In the early 1980s the idea of forming a United Front to coordinate the fighting against the Derg was being espoused by various groups. The TPLF had a unique suggestion of simultaneously forming a tactical United Front and a strategic United Democratic Front. Alliance with the former was expected to survive only as long as the Derg lasted while the latter was intended to eventually emerge as the ruling party. Believing this to be a scheme to use future enemies against the present one, many fronts rejected the TPLF invitation to join their United Front. After all independent organizations turned down their invitation either of the two kinds of fronts, the TPLF leaders started fabricating pliable groups out of hostage individuals. The result was the formation by the TPLF of bogus liberation organizations for the Oromo, Afar, Amhara, etc.; often bearing the appellation Peoples Democratic Organizations (PDO). Thereafter, the TPLF began the incestuous practice that it considered necessary to form the EPRDF – wedding its offspring.

Simultaneously, the TPLF stepped up the formation of the so-called Marxist-Leninist core of the TPLF in its subsidiaries. It created the organ, and the security apparatus that pervade all branches of the EPRDF to serve as instruments for stifling any diversity within it. The PDOs can survive only by paying complete allegiance to their creator and master, the TPLF. It is not likely the TPLF will ever overcome the inevitable attitude of patronage of these bodies that it brought into existence. This situation inevitably puts the PDOs in a paradoxical position of posing as the spokesperson of their nations while in practice advancing the Tigrayan agenda of domination. Unless their allegiance to the TPLF takes precedence, however, the EPRDF’s dominant position in the empire cannot last for long.

The PDOs, who are burdened with this kind of disability stand no chance in a fair peaceful political competition with other independent political organizations. Hence, they will be forced to bank on the coercive effect of TPLF/EPRDF military backing instead of winning their community by persuasive means. And every time they employ this option their alienation from and rejection by their respective communities increase. This path cannot lead to the cultivation of a democratic relationship with their own society or with other groups. The lack of internal democracy in the EPRDF is perhaps the most serious obstacle for the hope of overall democratization of the empire.

Clearly the TPLF/EPRDF has nothing to gain in the short term by allowing such an internal practice of genuine democracy. The Tigrayans have always been second on Ethiopia’s political totem pole. The TPLF’s aim at least since mid-1980s has been to be on top. The TPLF/EPRDF acceptance of democracy, however, could thrust them into the number three position after Oromos and Amharas, basically because of demographic reasons.

The other equally problematic factor is the refusal of the overthrown Amhara elite to reconcile themselves to the current political reality or to interact with spokespersons of other colonized nations in Ethiopia on a basis of equality and partnership. Their only agenda continues to be the recovery of their privileged political, economic, cultural and linguistic status. They approach other groups only to manipulate them to do the fighting so that they can return to their previous position. This became clear when Oromos and other southern peoples tried to make a common cause with some of the remnants of the overthrown elite through discussions in Paris in late 1993.

The new situation is slowly crystallizing Ethiopian politics into three irreconcilable elements. The present Tigrayan ruling clique appears determined to stay in power, like its predecessors. The overthrown elite is determined to recoup its eminent position. And those who desire to become equal partners in the affairs of the empire are frustrated and continue to press for the respect of their legitimate political rights.